Financial and intellectual capital
With a strong presence in its key markets, a long track record of successful investment, a strong investment pipeline and a balance sheet reinforced by the proceeds of a recent rights issue, we believe JLG is well placed to continue its strategy of growth and returns for shareholders.
JLG’s H118 results demonstrated the continuing growth of the business post the March rights issue.
The all-important NAV rose from 281p (306p restated for the rights issue) to 307p, an increase of 9.3%. The NAV per share exceeded our forecast for FY18 of 303p. The principal components of the movement in the NAV can be seen in Exhibit 2. The significant FV movement (£193.9m) was helped by the disposal of JLG’s remaining 15% of the InterCity Express Programme (IEP Phase 1) in May. The project was sold for £232m, above book value, and JLG has disclosed that the net benefit from value enhancements and other changes, of £86.3m, was primarily due to the gain on the disposal of IEP Phase 1. JLG also benefited from a change in operational discount rates, which totalled £43.2m of the £193.9m. Overall, the weighted average discount rate fell to 8.7% from 8.8% as at 31 December 2017. As always, the unwinding of discounting (£47.8m) and reductions in construction premiums (£23.2m), embedded value within the portfolio, contributed significantly to the FV movement. The IAS 19 pension gain, which we had not included in our forecasts, added 6p/share to NAV growth.
Exhibit 2: Principal components of NAV growth in H118 (p/share)
(£m) |
Opening value |
Rights issue |
FV move of portfolio |
IAS 19 pension gain |
Other P&L items |
Dividends paid |
Closing value |
NAV |
306 |
(34) |
40 |
6 |
(4) |
(7) |
307 |
The other important benchmark, DPS, increased 2.9%, to 1.80p per share (from the rebased 1.75p per share). In total, JLG has achieved a CAGR in NAV per share, including dividends, of 15.5% in the three years to the end of December 2017.
Following the results, we have revised our forecasts for FY18 and beyond. The details are set out in the financial section of this report, but the principal changes are shown in the table below.
Exhibit 3: Forecast revisions 2018–20e
|
Old |
New |
Change |
NAV |
EPS |
DPS |
NAV |
EPS |
DPS |
NAV |
EPS |
DPS |
p/share |
p/share |
p/share |
p/share |
p/share |
p/share |
% |
% |
% |
2018e |
303 |
40.6 |
9.2 |
318 |
57.3 |
9.2 |
5.0 |
41.1 |
0.0 |
2019e |
338 |
44.4 |
9.4 |
354 |
46.3 |
9.4 |
4.7 |
4.3 |
0.0 |
2020e |
378 |
49.9 |
9.6 |
397 |
52.2 |
9.6 |
5.0 |
4.6 |
0.0 |
Source: Edison Investment Research
Exhibits 4 to 7 show the investment portfolio split. In particular, we would point to the relatively smaller portion of the portfolio now invested in the UK. In addition, it is worth noting the five largest investments now comprise c 41.3% of the portfolio (FY17 39.3%).
Exhibit 4: Portfolio by revenue (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 5: Portfolio by investment stage (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 6: Portfolio by sector (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 7: Portfolio by geography (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 4: Portfolio by revenue (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 6: Portfolio by sector (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 5: Portfolio by investment stage (30 June 2018)
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Exhibit 7: Portfolio by geography (30 June 2018)
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Of the 10 largest investments, only three are located in the UK: IEP Phase 2, Cramlington Biomass and Manchester Waste Thermal Power Station. JLG has published book value ranges for each of its five largest primary and secondary investments, shown in Exhibit 8.
Exhibit 8: Valuation of JLG’s five largest primary and secondary investments
Phase |
Project |
Value |
Primary |
IEP Phase 2 |
> £225m |
Primary |
Denver Eagle P3 |
£75m - £100m |
Primary |
Sydney Light Rail |
£50m - £75m |
Primary |
New Generation Rollingstock |
£25m - £50m |
Primary |
Cramlington Biomass |
£25m - £50m |
Secondary |
Rocksprings Wind Farm |
£50m - £100m |
Secondary |
New Royal Adelaide Hospital |
£50m - £75m |
Secondary |
Buckthorn Wind Farm |
£50m - £75m |
Secondary |
Manchester Waste TPS Co |
£50m - £75m |
Secondary |
Klettwitz Wind Farm |
£25m - £50m |
In March 2018, JLG launched a one for three rights issue at 177p (issuing 122.32m shares) to raise £210m net of cost. A relatively heavy share issue, the price was deeply discounted (c 26.8% to the theoretical ex-rights price).
The rationale for the issue was to enable JLG to increase the scale of its operations and to take advantage of the higher proportion of attractive investment opportunities that were now available to it, as its relationship with partners and other developers strengthened. Although JLG raised capital at the time of its IPO in 2015, the scale of the opportunities, particularly in the US, has exceeded expectations.
JLG’s corporate philosophy has been to adhere to a self-funding model, whereby new investment commitments are financed through operational cash flow and investment realisations. At the time of its rights issue, JLG reiterated its belief in the self-funding model but in recent years (Exhibit 9) investment commitments have generally far outstripped realisations. However, H118 results highlighted the volatility of this trend with realisations of £241.5m, in large part due to the disposal IEP Phase 1 (£232m), far outstripping new investment commitments of £39.2m. It is conceivable that a parity of commitments and realisations can be achieved, although we view this as more likely to be in the long term given the current strength of global infrastructure markets.
Exhibit 9: JLG investment commitments vs realisations 2014–17 (£m)
|
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
Total |
New investment commitments |
217.2 |
180.5 |
181.9 |
382.9 |
962.5 |
Realisations |
198.5 |
86.3 |
146.6 |
289.0 |
720.4 |
JLG’s business model is based on its investment origination and asset management capabilities. Initial value is created through establishing greenfield infrastructure projects, while additional value is derived from enhancing each project’s cash flow via efficiency improvements and cost optimisation and also from de-risking the projects. Between 31 December 2014 and 31 December 2017, JLG made 28 new investments and disposed of 21 projects. Effective implementation of the model is based on the integration of the project origination and asset management business, JLG’s independent status allowing it to forge wide-ranging alliances with other market participants and the group’s intellectual capital based on its extensive network acquired through deals in different geographies and sectors over a long timeframe. JLG’s expertise and market presence has allowed it to build a strong track record of growth and an extensive investment pipeline. Given JLG’s experience of different geographies and asset types and the existence of long-term relationships with other investors and contacts, we believe it is a business model that it would be difficult for competitors to replicate.
The importance of embedded growth
For JLG the key measurement of how successful it has been in developing its business model and implementing its strategy is growth in the DPS and NAV per share. In the period 2015–17 JLG has achieved a CAGR of 15.5% in NAV per share (including DPS). Exhibit 10 shows that JLG has posted impressive growth in several key benchmarks.
Exhibit 10: Progression of operational benchmarks (2012–17)
(£m) |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
CAGR |
Pipeline (PPP only) |
925.0 |
986.0 |
1,067.0 |
1,135.0 |
1,408.0 |
1,585 |
11.4% |
Total portfolio value |
575.9 |
684.8 |
772.4 |
902.8 |
1,175.9 |
2,150 |
15.7% |
NAV |
437.0 |
528.0 |
649.8 |
889.6 |
1,016.8 |
1,124 |
20.8% |
The evolution of the portfolio is the key determinant of NAV per share. While new investment and realisations play an important role in determining the portfolio value, the NAV is also significantly influenced by FV adjustments (see Exhibit 1).
It is worth reiterating that an important part of the overall FV movement relates to the embedded value and is generated by the twice-yearly updating of a project’s DCF. The two principal constituents of embedded growth (reduction of construction risk and the unwinding of the discount rate) contribute significantly to the overall FV movement (on average more than 60% of total FV movement in the last four years). In addition to FV movements, JLG generates cash flow from the cash yield on the secondary portfolio and fee income generated by JLCM for the provision of asset management services. In the next section we examine the role of JLCM.
JLIF, JLEN, investment management services and first offer
Although JLG itself only returned to the market in 2015, in the five years prior to its own flotation it listed two separate funds on the market, JLIF in 2010 and JLEN in 2014. JLG no longer has any holding in JLIF but it retains a small number of shares in JLEN (£9.7m c 2.4% as at 30 June 2018). However, JLG does provide investment management services (through John Laing Capital Management) to the two funds and retains a first-offer arrangement for certain types of asset disposal with JLIF and JLEN.
In the case of investment management services JLG generates a management fee based on a percentage of external assets under management (£1,649m at December 2017; £1,808.1m at H118). In 2017 JLG generated revenue, from external assets under management, of £16.7m, equivalent to 1.01% of year-end funds under management. In H118, investment management revenue totalled £9.4m, primarily from JLIF and JLEN, but also including some director fees.
In addition to the provision of investment management services, JLG has first-offer agreements with JLIF and JLEN, covering certain types of asset disposals, including rail, road and accommodation. However it is important to stress that the first-offer agreements with JLIF and JLEN do not require JLG to sell to the two funds. In 2014–17, approximately 70% of assets (by sale proceeds) were acquired by JLIF and JLEN. According to JLG, between 31 December 2014 and 31 December 2017, it made 21 divestments of entire or part interests in its investment portfolio, predominantly of investments from within its secondary investment portfolio. Exhibit 11 below shows the percentage of assets sold to either JLIF or JLEN. Significantly, the two largest disposals in 2017 and 2018, including the recent IEP Phase 1, were made to third parties. However, with JLG’s declining UK investment base and JLIF’s UK focus, the proportion sold to JLIF and JLEN might be expected to decline. We do not expect JLG’s ability to divest assets to be significantly affected by the potential loss of a first-offer agreement with JLIF.
Exhibit 11: Divestments to JLIF and JLEN
£m |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
PPP divestments by JLG |
15 |
90 |
246 |
Acquisitions by JLIF |
12 |
90 |
103 |
Acquisitions by JLIF (%) |
80% |
100% |
42% |
RE divestments by JLG |
72 |
50 |
43 |
Acquisitions by JLIF |
72 |
50 |
43 |
Acquisitions by JLIF (%) |
100% |
100% |
100% |
In light of JLIF’s recent recommendation to shareholders to accept the offer from Dalmore Capital and Equitix Investment Management, which is expected to become effective this autumn, we set out the basis of JLG’s relationships with JLIF and JLEN and the terms of the agreements. The investment management agreement can be terminated by either party, with a one-year notice period. JLIF can also terminate in six months, with the payment of an additional six months of fees. The first-offer agreement relating to non-rails assets can also be terminated by either party, giving one year’s notice, or if the JLIF investment advisory agreement has already been terminated, with a 45-day notice period. The first-offer agreement related to rail assets can only be terminated in the event of a material breach of the agreement or in the event of insolvency.
If the proposed offer for JLIF proceeds as expected, there is a possibility that both the investment advisory agreements and the first-offer agreement will be terminated. The immediate revenue impact would be the loss of the investment management fee relating to JLIF. Given the asset split between JLIF and JLEN (broadly 75/25%), we would estimate the revenue lost to be in the region of £14.3m (75% of £19m) on annual basis, equivalent to c 3p/share. However, we would also expect some reduction in costs resulting from any changes. The impact of the absence of a first-offer agreement with JLIF is harder to evaluate. Given the boards of JLIF and JLEN are free to choose whether to make an offer for any particular asset, there is no reason to suppose they have systematically overbid for assets and the premiums paid have not been out of line with that achieved by JLG’s sales to third parties.
Exhibit 12: Growth in external assets under management and associated fee income
£m |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
External AUM (year-end) |
1,019.9 |
1,136.4 |
1,472.0 |
1,648.5 |
External AUM (average) |
908.0 |
1,078.2 |
1,304.2 |
1,560.3 |
Growth in AUM (%) |
28% |
11% |
30% |
12% |
Fees From AMS/AUM (%) |
1.1% |
1.1% |
1.1% |
1.2% |
UK concerns offset by increasing internationalisation
Despite the uncertainty surrounding JLIF, JLG’s share price has recovered lost ground in recent months after a period of weakness in the second half of 2017 and the beginning of 2018 related to adverse newsflow in the UK. As we highlighted in a previous report, in September 2017 the Labour Party indicated that if it were to form the next government it would ‘abandon PFI as a tool for future infrastructure investment’ and ‘bring in-house existing PFI projects’. JLG has not quantified, publicly at least, the impact of any changes to the PFI but we have calculated previously the impact would likely to be less than 5p per share. We believe that given the reduced percentage of the portfolio invested in the UK (30.6% 30 June 2018, versus 33.9% 31 December 2017) and the small proportion of the pipeline (less than 5% of the PPP pipeline) focused on the UK, this will not act as a significant impediment to future growth at JLG.
We have written previously (JLG: positive outlook for growth) about the positive trends in the global market for infrastructure and renewable energy. We believe the key drivers of population growth, urbanisation and tightening environmental standards remain in place. Historic underinvestment in infrastructure assets over the last 10 years (since the financial crash) has only increased the pressure for investment. In addition, we believe the falling costs of wind and solar generation will lead to renewable energy taking an increasingly large share of investment in new generation capacity. JLG remains positive on the general outlook and the pipeline of potential investment opportunities now stands at £2,300m (75 projects) (+c 7% versus FY17 £2,150m). In particular, JLG sees significant opportunities in the US and parts of Europe, although the outlook for the UK appears less favourable (the UK now accounts for less than 5% of the PPP investment pipeline).
Of the total pipeline, JLG regards c £500m as short- to medium-term opportunities, split c £325m PPP (12 opportunities) and £186m renewable energy (six opportunities). Of the 12 PPP projects, 10 are located in North America and two in Europe (one in the UK). The six renewable energy projects are split: Europe four, Asia Pacific one and North America one.
Exhibit 13: JLG investment pipeline H118 by region (£m)
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Exhibit 14: JLG investment pipeline H118 by sector (£m)
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Exhibit 13: JLG investment pipeline H118 by region (£m)
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Exhibit 14: JLG investment pipeline H118 by sector (£m)
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According to JLG, the market for secondary assets remains strong and the yield shift between primary and secondary assets remains attractive.