The first and only publicly listed Formula One team
Sir Frank Williams first entered a car in the Formula One Championship in 1969. In 1977 he co-founded Williams with Sir Patrick Head. Since then, the team has won nine Constructors’ Championships and seven Drivers’ Championships, making it the third most successful team in history after Ferrari and McLaren. It listed on the German Stock Exchange in March 2011, raising approximately €60m for selling shareholders and becoming the first publicly owned Formula One team. It opted to list in Germany to avoid regulations in London that would have required the disclosure of key sources of income, in particular amounts from its principal sponsors. Sir Patrick stepped down from the board in December 2011 and remained a part-time employee until his retirement in 2015. Sir Frank Williams has retains a controlling 51.3% stake in the company. The company’s strategic objective is to build a championship winning Formula One team alongside a robust and profitable advanced engineering business.
Exhibit 1: Revenue by division
|
|
Source: Williams Grand Prix Holdings 2016 annual report
|
Exhibit 2: Revenue by division (LHS) and group PBT margin (RHS)
|
|
Source: Williams Grand Prix Holdings 2016 annual report
|
Williams Grand Prix Holdings consists of two separate legal entities: Williams Grand Prix Engineering, which operates the Williams Formula One team (currently branded Williams Martini Racing), and Williams Advanced Engineering (WAE). The group exists because of the Formula One team, and the Formula One team’s raison d’être is to win motor races. This leads to a business strategy where the primary capital allocation for the group is reinvestment in the business in pursuit of performance improvements. However, as the only publicly listed Formula One team, Williams is frequently faced with the difficult choice of balancing continued technical development with financial prudence; whereas several competitors benefit from higher budgets. The £14m of other income in 2016 mostly relates to a one off project delivered across the Formula One and WAE business units for an undisclosed customer. It is not expected to recur.
Williams Martini Racing competes in the Formula One World Championship, an annual nine-month long motor race based competition in which teams compete for the Constructors’ Championship and drivers compete for the Drivers’ Championship. It has two main sources of revenue: commercial rights income and partnership income.
This is the money received from Formula One (now part of Liberty Media Corporation) under the ‘Current Concorde Arrangements’. The prize fund paid to teams is a percentage of Formula One Group’s EBITDA (65% in FY15, equating to $876m), plus an additional amount that is c $120-175m. The majority of the prize fund is paid to teams based on their position in the Constructors’ Championships the previous year so in 2017, Williams is receiving commercial rights income based on its fifth place finish in the Constructors’ Championship in 2016.The correlation between Williams Formula One’s revenue and its performance on the track is evidenced by Exhibit 3. Generally, an improved performance on the track is followed by higher revenues the following year and vice versa.
Exhibit 3: Williams Formula One revenues compared to performance in the Constructors’ Championship, 2012-16
|
|
Source: Williams Grand Prix Holdings 2016 Annual Report and Formula One website
|
The distribution of the remainder is based on the following principles and measures of performance:
■
Success – meaning the long standing of a team within the World Championship and its reputation within the sport
■
Heritage – reflecting the extent of a team’s brand presence and perceived value to the World Championship over time
■
Longevity – measuring the contribution of a team by reference to the length of time a team has been participating in the World Championship
■
Commitment – recognising anticipated ongoing participation and investment of a team, including preparedness to provide a meaningful parent company guarantee, in order to secure medium- to long-term participation of teams and therefore the ongoing financial viability of the Formula One Group.
While there are some fixed fees, most of the prize fund elements are variable and are dependent on Formula One’s financial performance. Recent press speculation has suggested that in 2017 Ferrari will receive c $180m in commercials rights income, over twice as much as Williams who is estimated to receive $79m. Ferrari, Mercedes, Red Bull and McLaren are known to have agreed separate deals for Constructors’ Championship payments. Ferrari receives an additional payment for being the longest standing team.
This is the revenue from sponsorship and other branding activities. The primary form of corporate exposure is through the display of logos on cars, equipment and uniforms which are then on display during the live television broadcasts and other media coverage with a cumulative global audience of hundreds of millions of unique viewers. Williams is constantly seeking innovative ways to maximise the use of what is a finite space in order to attract more sponsors. However, branding is not important to all sponsors. Some are attracted by the hospitality available and offer it as a ‘money can’t buy’ prize to incentivise staff or entertain their clients. Others offer services in-kind, becoming partners rather than conventional sponsors and benefitting from the brand association with a Formula One team.
Williams has capacity for more sponsors and there is no regulatory limit on the amount of partnership income teams can receive, so there is potential for this revenue stream to grow. However it is constrained by the need to maintain a level of exclusivity for sponsors and there is downward pressure on pricing. Sponsorship deals are generally multi-year contracts and they are all set to expire or roll over at different points. Thus the company is unlikely to find itself with a sudden and unexpected drop in partnership income, unless there was a problem with the team which caused the sponsors to break their contracts.
Williams generates limited revenue through merchandise. This is because it chooses to protect its quality brand by only producing high-end goods, which means the volume of sales is low, albeit with reasonable margins.
Costs of participation in Formula One continue to rise, and there is no regulatory cap on the amount the teams are allowed to spend. Williams is competing with teams who have greater financial resources and therefore it has to make focused investments to try and deliver the maximum performance. This means that the division’s margin will always be under pressure (Exhibit 4). Personnel costs are the single biggest line item as high quality drivers, engineers and mechanics are crucial to the team’s on-track success. Other costs are research and development, materials and operation of the team activity at races.
Exhibit 4: Williams Formula One revenue, profit (LHS) and margin (RHS), 2012-16
|
|
Source: Williams Grand Prix Holdings 2016 annual report. Note: Margin for FY14 -48.1%.
|
Williams Advanced Engineering
Williams Advanced Engineering (WAE) is the technology and engineering services business of the Williams Grand Prix Holdings Group. It provides world class technical innovation, engineering, testing and manufacturing services to deliver energy efficient performance to the automotive, motorsport, civil aerospace, defence, sports science and energy sectors. It specialises in lightweight materials, battery systems, electronics, advanced aerodynamics, vehicle dynamics and holistic integration capabilities.
The origins of WAE were the acquisition by Williams of a stake in Williams Hybrid Power (WHP) in 2008. WHP’s business was the development of electromechanical flywheels for mobile applications such as buses, trams and high performance endurance racing cars, following the introduction of the Kinetic Energy Recover System (KERS) into Formula One for the 2009 season. While the flywheel technology was never used in Formula One, WHP has since seen its technology adapted for a range of applications, including on a series of buses for Go-Ahead. In April 2014 WHP was sold to GKN.
Since then the group has focused on the development of innovative technologies and it operates on a consultancy business model. WAE’s revenue and profit development is shown in Exhibit 5 below, and we note that 2012 sales were still benefiting from work on a concept car programme for Jaguar, the C-X75. Revenue grew 74% year-on-year in 2016 and there are currently 40-50 individual projects on the go, including the first major defence contract with General Dynamics. WAE does not intend to enter the world of mass manufacturing; rather it is focusing on niche areas where it can innovate for a wide range of clients. The main focus market is automotive OEMs where current penetration is estimated to be 30-40% so the potential for growth is clear. Its profitability has been volatile historically, and its margin rose from 6.0% in 2015 to 10.3% in 2016. It is apparently challenging for WAE to estimate project costs at the outset and some consume more engineering resource than expected. However, management is developing processes and systems to support delivery as the business grows, with the aim of improving profitability.
Exhibit 5: Williams Advanced Engineering revenue, profit (LHS) and margin (RHS), 2012-16
|
|
Source: Williams Grand Prix Holdings 2016 annual report
|
Management’s stated strategy is to build a championship winning Formula One team, alongside a robust and profitable advanced engineering business. Williams Grand Prix Holdings therefore has an unusual equity story because the focus is not about maximising returns for shareholders. At this current point in time, because WAE is in its relative infancy and only generating a small amount of profit (£4.2m of EBITDA in FY16 which was 27% of group EBITDA), all of its profits are reinvested into the Formula One team. However, as WAE grows there are a number of future scenarios of how we think management could choose to run the business:
■
Management continues to prioritise Formula One performance and as profits grow at WAE, investment in Williams Formula One rises commensurately. This currently feels the most likely. While there is a focus on cost efficiency and financial prudence within the group, Williams is owned and run by individuals who are passionate about Formula One. The focus of all Williams Formula One employees is to make its cars go faster, therefore if the group was able to invest more in the pursuit of speed, it seems logical to assume that it would.
■
WAE generates enough profit to fund the requirements of the Formula One team with some left over to return the shareholders: For management to pursue this strategy either spending caps would have to be introduced to Formula One teams across the board, or management would have to decide that it has a self-imposed spending limit, even if it had the means to spend more. Currently there are no caps on the amount a Formula One team can spend. Ferrari and Mercedes are thought to spend about three times the amount of Williams. There has been press speculation that Liberty Media is considering spending caps as a way to make the sport more competitive. While many support the idea in theory, enforcing such a rule would be challenging because all the teams categorise their spending in different ways, and there is a risk that the biggest teams would say they couldn’t comply with a lower limit and simply walk away from the sport. Sir Frank Williams’ continued influence on the company as the majority shareholder makes it seem unlikely that the board would actively decide to disadvantage its racing team against its competitors if it had the means to spend more.
■
Management chooses to prioritise shareholder return and invests enough in Williams Formula One to continue participation in the sport, but with an uncompetitive team which is out of contention for the podium. This feels the most unlikely scenario as it goes against the company’s DNA. However, this strategy could emerge if no spending caps are imposed and other teams continue to increase their spending making it harder for Williams to be competitive. At that point, Williams might then decide to focus on shareholder return.